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EVIDENCE--CREDIBILITY IMPEACHMENT AND THE DRUG-USING
WITNESs-State v. Renneberg, 83 Wn. 2d 735, 522 P.2d 835 (1974).
In chambers before the grand larceny trial of Milton and Virginia
LaVanway, the court apparently ruled that testimony about the de-
fendants' prior drug use' was inadmissible in the state's case. When
the defendants subsequently testified to their good character, however,
the trial court admitted such evidence for purposes of impeachment.
On appeal of their convictions defendants challenged the admission of
the evidence. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the convic-
tions, holding that once a defendant's character has been placed in
issue, evidence of drug use is admissible to attack his or her character
on cross-examination. The plurality opinion also stated in dictum that
such evidence is inadmissible to attack a defendant's capacity,2 absent
medical or scientific proof "connecting addiction to a lack of ve-
racity."3 State v. Renneberg, 83 Wn. 2d 735, 522 P.2d 835 (1974).
Assuming a defendant is competent to testify and has taken the
stand, 4 his or her credibility may be impeached on cross-examination
by attacking either (1) capacity, or (2) character.5 Capacity is at-
tacked by the introduction of evidence of a defect in the defendant's
I. The defendants were not addicted to drugs either at the time of the alleged crime
or at the time they testified at trial. State v. Renneberg. 83 Wn. 2d 735, 737. 522 P.2d
835, 836 (1974).
"Drug use" as employed in this note refers to use of any drug to which a high degree
of social opprobrium and prejudice attaches. A representative listing is contained in
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 69.50.203-.212 (1974). Such "use" may or may not include ad-
dictive usage.
2. Although the plurality-opinion in Renneberg spoke in terms of "credibility or
veracity," 83 Wn. 2d at 737, 522 P.2d at 836, it undoubtedly intended to refer only to
"capacity." Otherwise. the court's holding that evidence of drug use is inadmissible to
attack "credibility" absent expert testimony, but admissible to attack character, would
make little sense because character is a subcategory of credibility. See note 5 infra. This
is also the view adopted by the dissenting opinion in restating the holding of the case.
See text accompanying notes 21-23 infra.
3. 83 Wn. 2d at 737, 522 P.2d at 836.
4. "When a defendant in a criminal case takes the stand, he is subject to all the rules
relating to the cross-examination of other witnesses." State v. Jeane, 35 Wn. 2d 423.
431. 213 P.2d 633. 638 (1950). See also State v. Etheridge, 74 Wn. 2d 102, 443 P.2d 536
(1968); State v. Robideau, 70 Wn. 2d 994. 425 P.2d 880 (1967); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.52.040 (1974).
5. It is important to distinguish competency, credibility, capacity and character.
Competency is defined as a witness's ability to perceive, remember and communicate
the subject of his or her testimony, i.e., the witness's qualification to testify. See gener-
ally State v. Moorison, 43 Wn. 2d 23, 259 P.2d 1105 (1953); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE
§§ 45. 62 (Cleary ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]; Juviler. Psychiatric
Opinions as to Credibility of Witnesses: A Suggested Approach, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 648.
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ability to perceive, remember or communicate the subject matter of
testimony.6 If a defendant's characte7 is placed in evidence, either by
the introduction of a character witness or by his or her own testi-
649 (1960). In Washington, a party attacking a witness's competency pursuant to
WASH. REv. CODE § 5.60.050 (1974), is asking the trial court to disqualify the witness
from testifying at all:
The following persons shall not be competent to testify:
(1) Those who are of unsound mind, or intoxicated at the time of their produc-
tion for examination, and
(2) Children under ten years of age, who appear incapable of receiving just im-
pressions of the facts, respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly.
A specific factual determination as to the individual witness's ability to perceive, re-
member and communicate is prerequisite to determining whether a witness is "of un-
sound mind" under subsection (1) of the statute, because of the absence of any readily
ascertainable general rules. See State v. Wyse, 71 Wn. 2d 434, 429 P.2d 121 (1967);
State v. Hardung, 161 Wash. 379, 297 P. 167 (1931); McCutcheon v. Brownfield, 2 Wn.
App. 348, 467 P.2d 868 (1970). Should a witness's competency be challenged by show-
ing that he or she is "intoxicated" under subsection (1) of the statute, however, there is
authority that no factual determination as to ability to perceive, remember or communi-
cate is necessary; merely because the witness is within the enumerated class of intoxicated
witnesses, he or she may be disqualified. Benson v. Town of Hamilton, 34 Wash. 201, 75
P. 805 (1904); Fox v. Territory, 2 Wash. Terr. 297, 5 P. 603 (1884). Because of the
possibility that a drug-using witness may be classified as either "of unsound mind" or
"intoxicated," the differentiation between the two types of witnesses may be important.
Credibilityis defined generally as believability or worthiness of belief. See In re Gal-
linger's Estate, 31 Wn. 2d 823, 829, 199 P.2d 575, 579 (1948) (emphasizing the breadth
of the term credibility); Note, Psychiatric Examinations of Witnesses: Standards, Tim-
ing, and Use by Indigents, 55 IowA L. REv. 1286, 1289 (1970). Two subcategories of
credibility are capacity and character. Capacity, like competency, is attacked by intro-
ducing evidence of an inability to perceive, remember or communicate the subject
matter of a witness's testimony. Nevertheless, issues of competency and capacity are
treated quite differently. A witness's competency is challenged before the trial court to
completely disqualify the witness; a witness's capacity is challenged before the trier of
fact to impeach the witness's credibility. The question of competency goes to the testi-
mony's admissibility; the question of capacity goes to the testimony's believability.
Proof of a mere deficiency in a witness's perception, for example, would probably not
render the witness incompetent to testify, whereas proof of a total lack of perception
would render the witness incompetent. The Washington court has held competent to tes-
tify witnesses: who were "backward in mental development" and "at times seemed in-
capable of understanding the most simple questions," State v. McMullen, 142 Wash. 7,
8, 252 P. 108, 109 (1927); whose testimony was unconnected, incoherent and discred-
ited by expert medical testimony, Sumerlin y. Department of Labor & Indus., 8 Wn. 2d
43, 111 P.2d 603 (1941); who were insane, State v. Moorison, 43 Wn. 2d 23, 259 P.2d
1105 (1953), or mentally ill, State v. Allen, 67 Wn. 2d 238, 406 P.2d 950 (1965); or whc
were drug users and former inhabitants of mental institutions, State v. Thach, 5 Wn
App. 194, 486 P.2d 1146 (1971). See generally MCCORMICK, supra § 45; 3A J. WIo
MORE, EVIDENCE §§ 931-38 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
Finally, character, as a subcategory of credibility, is defined as some ethical trait al
fecting one's propensity for truth or falsehood in the matter being litigated. See genet
ally MCCORMICK, supra §§ 41-44; WIGMORE, supra §§ 920-30. Thus, proof of a wit
ness's past criminal conviction, reputation or prior misconduct would reflect on the
witness's character and, therefore, arguably on his or her credibility.
6. See note 5 supra.
7. Id.
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mony,8 cross-examination is allowed regarding specific acts of miscon-
duct unrelated to the crime charged. 9
Prior Washington cases enunciated several rules concerning the re-
lationships between drug use and competency, capacity and character.
First, drug users have generally been found competent to testify. 10 Sec-
ond, evidence of drug addiction has been held admissible to attack ca-
pacity.' 1 Lankford v. Tombari extended this rule by admitting evi-
dence of addiction to, or mere use of, narcotics to attack a witness's
"propensity for veracity."' 12 Third, although early cases established the
admissibility of expert testimony linking drug use to incapacity, prior
8. See Part 11 infra. It is unclear whether the introduction of a character witness
places a defendant's character in evidence, or whether the defendant must also broach
the subject of character on his or her direct examination before it is "in evidence." In
State v. Donaldson, 76 Wn. 2d 513, 458 P.2d 21 (1969), the defendant introduced a char-
acter witness, then took the stand himself and placed his character in evidence on direct
examination. The court initially stated that " [a] ppellant chose to put his own character
in issue by calling character witnesses to testify on his own behalf." Id. at 515, 458 P.2d
at 23 (emphasis added). In its holding, however, the court stated: "When appellant took
the stand in his own behalf in the instant action, he testified as to his own past good be-
havior land] . ..opened the door for legitimate cross-examination of his testimony
." Id. at 517, 458 P.2d at 24.
9. State v. Donaldson, 76 Wn. 2d 513, 458 P.2d 21 (1969); State v. Emmanuel. 42
Wn. 2d 1,253 P.2d 386 (1953): State v. O'Donnell. 195 Wash. 471, 81 P.2d 509 (1938).
10. State v. Concannon. 25 Wash. 327. 65 P. 534(1901). is the first case in which the
Washington Supreme Court explicitly approved the admission of a drug-using witness's
testimony, although in an earlier case, State v. Robinson, 12 Wash. 491. 41 P. 884
(1895), the court seems to have assumed the admissibility of such testimony. See also
State v. Thach, 5 Wn. App. 194. 486 P.2d 1146 (1971).
11. State v. Smith. 103 Wash. 267, 174 P. 9 (1918): State v. Robinson. 12 Wash.
491,41 P. 884(1895).
12. 35 Wn. 2d 412, 421. 213 P.2d 627, 632 (1950). Subsequent cases have equated
"propensity for veracity" with credibility. See United States v. Kearney. 420 F.2d 170
(D.C. Cir. 1969): State v. Renneberg, 83 Wn. 2d 735. 740, 522 P.2d 835. 838 (Hale.
C.J., concurring); State v. Kimbriel, 8 Wn. App. 859. 510 P.2d 255 (1973). Because of
the brevity of the opinion, it is impossible to determine whether the Lankford court was
referring to credibility or, more specifically, capacity. Wigmore, upon whom the court
relied. see 35 Wn. 2d at 421. 213 P.2d at 632. speaks in terms of capacity: "Any dis-
eased impairment of the testimonial powers, arising from whatever source, ought also to
be considered [in impeaching the witness] .... [A] ccordingly. the morphine or other
drug habit, in that it may have had such an effect, should be received." 3 J. WIGMORE.
EVIDENCE § 934. at 481-82 (3d ed. 1940).
There is also evidence that a statement as to the credibility or capacity of a drug-using
witness was not a necessary element of the Lankford holding. The wife of respondent in
Lankford had worked in appellant's pharmacy while respondent was in the military. In
order to prove alienation of affection, respondent was required to show that appellant
was in fact the procuring cause in drawing the wife's affections away from her husband.
As a defense, appellant introduced a number of witnesses who testified that they had on
numerous occasions taken the wife home from the pharmacy late in the evening. On
cross-examination, respondent intimated that the reason for the witnesses frequenting
the pharmacy was their drug use. This discussion of drug use was apparently what
prompted the Lankford court's holding that evidence of drug use was admissible to
demonstrate lack of "propensity for veracity." Yet neither party urged this on the court.
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to Renneberg the court had not required such testimony to justify the
admission of evidence of drug use to impeach capacity. 13 Finally, no
prior Washington cases dealt expressly with the admissibility of drug
use to impeach a witness's character. 14
This note examines the effect of State v. Renneberg on impeach-
ment of testimonial capacity and character by introduction of evi-
dence of drug use. The court's finding that both defendants placed
their character in evidence potentially conflicts with prior case law
and creates doubt as to the appropriate criterion for determining
whether a defendant has placed his or her character in evidence. More
importantly, the decision introduces two different criteria for deter-
mining the admissibility of evidence of drug use: (1) if the evidence is
introduced to attack capacity, it must be accompanied by expert testi-
mony; but (2) if it is introduced to attack character, it is admissible
whenever the defendant's character has been placed in evidence. Un-
fortunately, such a differentiation is difficult to justify in light of the
complex interrelationship between capacity and character, and the
inability to determine the effect of drug use on capacity or character
except on a case-by-case basis. A more tenable standard would pre-
clude the introduction of drug use to attack either capacity or charac-
ter, absent expert testimony establishing some discernible adverse ef-
fect of drug use upon capacity or character. Such a view, recognizing
the highly prejudicial nature of evidence of drug use, would call for a
case-by-case expert determination of the effect of drug use on a wit-
ness's capacity or character.
See Brief for Appellant at 33, Brief for Respondent at 75-78, Lankford v. Tombari,
35 Wn. 2d 412, 213 P.2d 627 (1950). Furthermore, "according to the jurors' own
affidavits, the jury did not believe that any such thing [drug use] went on at the drug
store." Brief for Respondent at 77-78. Thus it is plausible that any statement as to the
"propensity for veracity" of a drug-using witness was unnecessary to the Lankford
decision.
13. Dictum in State v. Robinson, 12 Wash. 491, 41 P. 884 (1895), established the
admissibility of expert testimony regarding the effect of drug use on a witness's "mental
faculties." Id. at 497, 41 P. at 886. The expert testimony was properly excluded in Rob-
inson, however, because the expert witness had been asked his opinion as to the "veraci-
ty" of another witness. Id. The court's differentiation seems to go the proper scope of the
expert's opinion testimony rather than any capacity/character dichotomy.
In State v. Smith, 103 Wash. 267, 174 P. 9 (1918), involving a prosecution for the sale
of morphine, the court held that expert testimony could be introduced to prove the effect
of the drug on the "mind and memory" of the user. Id. at 269, 174 P. at 9.
14. In State v. White, 10 Wash. 611, 613, 39 P. 160, 161 (1895), although admitting
that it knew of no valid reason for excluding a drug-addicted witness, the court noted
that "the authorities agree that the testimony of such persons is very unreliable, and
juries should be carefully cautioned as to the credence to be given it [citations omit-
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I. THE RENNEBERG COURT'S REASONING
Six justices15 in Renneberg held evidence of drug use admissible to
attack defendants' characters even though no expert testimony was
introduced to establish the relation of drug use to defects in character.
Stating no reason for the court's holding, the plurality simply sug-
gested that, "if a defendant puts his prior conduct into issue by testi-
fying as to his own past good behavior, he may be cross-examined as
to specific acts of misconduct unrelated to the crime charged."' 16
Without revealing its determining criteria, the Renneberg court then
held the testimony of both husband and wife codefendants sufficient
to place their characters in evidence.
In dictum the plurality, joined by the three justices dissenting from
the court's holding,' 7 modified Lankford v. Tombari'8 by stating that
tedl .'" While it is evident that the court was referring to a drug-addicted witness's credi-
bility, it is unclear whether it referred to capacity or character.
State v. Concannon. 25 Wash. 327, 65 P. 534 (1901), is a better example of the court
at least implicitly considering the character, as opposed to the capacity. of a drug-using
witness. One witness in Concannon was administered opium while on the stand when he
could not proceed without it. Id. at 330, 65 P. at 535. While stating that habitual use of
opium "is known to utterly deprave the victim and render him unworthy of belief." the
supreme court left the question of the admissibility and credibility of a drug user's testi-
mony to the trial court and jury, respectively. Id. at 335, 65 P. at 537. If "depravity" be
considered a moral character trait rather than a physiological inability to perceive, re-
member or communicate, the Concannon court was speaking in terms of character
rather than capacity.
The character of a drug-using witness also seemed at issue in Lankford v. Tombari.
35 Wn. 2d 412. 213 P.2d 627 (1950). in which respondent stated that his questions as to
the witnesses' drug use were not related to their believability, but were merely an at-
tempt to find out why they were at the pharmacy. Brief for Respondent at 77. See note
12 supra. His actual purpose, however. may have been to demonstrate the witnesses'
collective character and attack it to discredit their credibility by showing why the wit-
nesses "seemed 'afraid of questions as to why they were always at the drug store' and
acted as though the defendant had something on them.' " Brief for Respondent at 75.
State v. Renneberg represents the first time the Washington court expressly differen-
tiated in any meaningful way between a drug user's capacity and character.
15. Brachtenbach, Hunter. Stafford and Wright. JJ. (plurality opinion); Hale. C.J..
and Hamilton, J. (concurring opinion).
16. 83 Wn. 2d at 738, 522 P.2d at 837 (1974), quoting State v. Emmanuel. 42 Wn.
2d I, 14. 253 P.2d 386, 393 (1953).
17. Brachtenbach, Hunter, Stafford and Wright, JJ. (plurality opinion): Finley.
Utter and Rosellini, JJ. (dissenting opinion).
18. 35 Wn. 2d 412. 213 P.2d 627 (1950). In Lankford. the court admitted evidence
of drug addiction to attack veracity without requiring expert testimony. See note 12
supra.
In that Renneberg, a criminal case, modifies Lankford. a civil case, it seems apparent
that the Washington Supreme Court did not wish to distinguish criminal from civil cases
in this area of the law. Thus, any question raised by dictum in State v. Kimbriel. 8 Wn.
App. 859, 510 P.2d 255 (1973), suggesting that Lankford might be inapplicable to a
criminal proceeding, is laid to rest by Renneberg.
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evidence of drug use is inadmissible to attack capacity unless expert
testimony is introduced to demonstrate a causal connection between
drug use and impairment of the witness's faculties. 19 Absent expert
testimony, evidence of drug use is to be excluded from attacks on
capacity because of its highly prejudicial nature. 20
Justice Finley, dissenting from the holding, preferred to exclude in
all cases evidence of drug use proffered to attack character.21 To him,
the plurality had "proven too much" by conceding that without expert
testimony, evidence of drug use is to be excluded from attacks on
witness' proclivity for truth-telling," 22 yet failing to require the neces-
sary showing of causation between addiction and lack of moral char-
acter. Furthermore, Justice Finley found the introduction of evidence
of drug use to attack character to be overly prejudicial: "Unscienti-
fically established admissions of this nature place before the jury evi-
dence of unrelated misconduct which will inevitably tend to prejudice
the defendant in the eyes of jurors.123
Because of the differentiation made between capacity and character
in the Renneberg opinion and the rule that character can be im-
peached only after being placed in evidence, it is critical to determine
precisely when a defendant's character is in evidence. Unfortunately,
Renneberg confuses any determination as to the point at which a de-
fendant's testimony is sufficient to place his or her character in evi-
dence.
19. 83 Wn. 2d at 737, 522 P.2d at 836. Concurring Chief Justice Hale, joined by
Justice Hamilton, objected to this dictum and would leave Lankford "well enough
alone." Id. at 743, 522 P.2d at 839. Hale emphasized that since evidence of drug addic-
tion was clearly admissible in the instant case to attack the defendants' characters, there
was no need to rule on its admissibility regarding their capacity. Id. at 741, 522 P.2d at
838. He also criticized the court's transformation of the admissibility of evidence of
drug addiction from a question of law (uniformly determined by the trial court) to a
question of fact (determined on a case-by-case basis by the trier of fact), suggesting that
such a rule would produce lack of uniformity in trial court rulings. Id.
20. Writing for the plurality, Justice Brachtenbach stated:
In view of society's deep concern today with drug usage and its consequent con-
demnation by many if not most, evidence of drug addiction is necessarily prejudi-
cial in the minds [sic] of the average juror. Additionally there is no proof before
the court connecting addiction to a lack of veracity. If such medical or scientific
proof were made, it might well be admissible as relevant to credibility. Absent such
proof its relevance on credibility or veracity is an unknown factor while its preju-
dice is within common knowledge.
Id. at 737, 522 P.2d at 836.
21. Id. at 748-49, 522 P.2d at 842, and cases cited therein.
22. Id. at 748, 522 P.2d at 842.
23. Id. at 748-49, 522 P.2d at 842.
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II. PLACING CHARACTER "IN EVIDENCE"
In Renneberg, defendant wife testified as to her work and college
experience, and her participation in a beauty pageant, glee club, drill
team, pep club and science club.2 4 Defendant husband testified2 5
as to his occupation as a professional photographer, as to his physical
dress on the day in question, as to his somewhat lengthy engagement
and subsequent marriage to the defendant wife whose character had
been so vividly pictured, as to his working in his garden at home and
as to the planned attendance at a family barbecue on the day of the
alleged crime.
The Renneberg court concluded without explanation that both de-
fendants placed their characters in evidence by so testifying. This con-
clusion raises interpretive problems regarding the interrelationship
between Renneberg and State v. Bauman,2 6 in which the court held
that a defendant could testify to the events leading to and surrounding
the crime without placing his or her character in evidence, and there-
fore without fear of cross-examination as to unrelated misconduct. 2 7
These interpretive shortcomings in turn lead to constitutional prob-
lems.
The Renneberg court's failure to explain how it determined that
defendant husband had placed his character in evidence suggests that
the court did not adequately consider Bauman. That Bauman was
modified by Renneberg is implied by the court's intimation that the
husband's character was placed in evidence because the wife placed
her character in evidence. In describing the husband's testimony, the
court stated that he testified about his lengthy engagement and mar-
riage "to the defendant wife whose character had been so vividly pic-
tured .... "28 This language implies a "guilt by association" analysis
by which one codefendant may waive or secure another's evidentiary
rights. Fundamental fairness requires that the introduction of char-
acter evidence by one codefendant not be imputed to the other.
24. Id. at 738, 522 P.2d at 836.
25. id.
26. 77 Wn. 2d 938, 940, 468 P.2d 684, 685 (1970).
27. Bauman's chief attribute was the consistency it brought to an area of the law that
previously lacked any tenable criterion to determine the permissible scope of a defend-
ant's testimony. Compare State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wn. 2d 1, 253 P.2d 386 (1953). with
State v. Hollister, 157 Wash. 4, 288 P. 249 (1930).
28. 83 Wn. 2d at 738, 522 P.2d at 836 (emphasis added).
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The importance of retaining Bauman or establishing a similarly
definitive standard is heightened by constitutional problems that arise
in the absence of such a rule.2 9 In State v. Hill,30 decided just two
months prior to Renneberg, the Washington Supreme Court reversed
defendant's conviction because the trial court had erroneously ruled
that two prior convictions that had been reversed and dismissed on
appeal were admissible to impeach the defendant should he take the
stand.31 After noting that the defendant viewed the introduction of
such evidence as so prejudicial that he decided not to testify, the court
stated:3 2
[Defendant] was entitled by constitutional and statutory provision to
give his version of the events if he wished. The trial court's unfortu-
nate ruling, which would have saddled the defendant's testimony with
the taint of the two reversed convictions, prejudicially deprived him of a
free and voluntary choice in the matter and literally compelled him to
remain silent.
Similarly, a defendant with highly prejudicial misconduct in his or
her background is "literally compelled to remain silent" if there is a
substantial ambiguity as to the events to which he or she can testify
without fear of raising the past misconduct. The ambiguity inherent
in Renneberg is potentially sufficient to violate the principles of State
v. Hill. 33
Any interpretation of Renneberg which fosters such an ambiguity
should be avoided if possible. A more acceptable explanation is that
the court retained the Bauman rule by finding that each defendant
29. Both the state and federal constitutions guarantee a defendant's right to refrain
from being a witness against him or herself. U.S. CoNST. amend. V; WASH. CONST. art. I,
§ 9. Conversely, the state constitution and a state statute guarantee a defendant's right
to testify on his or her own behalf. WASH. CONST. amend. 10; WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.52.040 (1974).
30. 83 Wn. 2d 558, 520 P.2d 618 (1974).
31. Under the Washington rule, the defendant should have been able to testify
without cross-examination regarding past criminal proceedings not resulting in convic-
tion. See WASH. RE-v. CODE § 5.60.040 (1974) (civil cases); id. § 10.52.030 (criminal
cases); State v. Mack, 80 Wn. 2d 19, 490 P.2d 1303 (1971); State v. Tate, 2 Wn. App.
241, 469 P.2d 999 (1970).
32. 83 Wn. 2d at 565, 520 P.2d at 621.
33. Although the Renneberg court failed to address this constitutional issue, it seems
unlikely that the court was unaware of it. Hill was decided less than two months prior to
Renneberg. Moreover, Justice Finley makes note in his dissent of the possible constitu-
tional ramifications of the Renneberg holding in light of Hill. Renneberg, 83 Wn. 2d at
745 n.3, 522 P.2d at 840 n.3.
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individually placed his or her own character in evidence. 34 Defendant
wife clearly surpassed the bounds of Bauman by testifying as to her
lifetime activities. Defendant husband, by testifying as to his engage-
ment and marriage, also testified to events clearly unrelated to the cir-
cumstances surrounding the crime and thus outside the Bauman stan-
dard.35 This interpretation retains the Bauman rule and prevents in-
fringement of a defendant's constitutional rights to testify or remain
silent. It also allows a defendant some foreknowledge of the permis-
sible scope of testimony: If the defendant testifies only to the events
leading to and surrounding the crime, only his or her capacity may be
impeached; any additional testimony, however, as to unrelated past
conduct or behavior, opens the door to character impeachment. 36
II1. CREDIBILITY IMPEACHMENT OF A DRUG-USING
WITNESS AFTER RENNEBERG
Assuming the court properly determined that both defendants
placed their characters in issue, Renneberg reveals further shortcom-
ings concerning attacks on a drug user's capacity and character. The
immediate effect of the plurality opinion is to introduce two different
34. While it is fairly clear that testimony as to the husband's engagement and mar-
riage was outside the bounds established by Bauman, evaluation of the remainder of the
husband's testimony is difficult because of the Renneberg opinion's brevity. The court
states that the husband testified about his occupation, his garden work and his planned
attendance at a family barbecue. See note 25 and accompanying text .supra. If defendant
husband was attempting to characterize himself as a hard-working. industrious member
of the community. whose activities included gardening and attending family outings. the
court would be justified in holding that this testimony contributed to the determination
that the defendant had placed his character in evidence. If, on the other hand, this testi-
mony was an integral part of the husband's description of the events of the day in ques-
tion, and if the court was utilizing the Baumnan rule, it likely played no role in the
court's determination of whether the defendant had placed his character in evidence.
35. After describing the manner in which defendant husband had placed his char-
acter in evidence, the Renneberg plurality concluded unequivocally: "The state was en-
titled to complete the tapestry with his admitted drug addiction." 83 Wn. 2d at 738.
522 P.2d at 836.
36. Although refusing to testify may seem a viable alternative for defendants faced
with the Baumnan-Renneberg ambiguity, this course of action is also fraught with diffi-
culties. For example. a poll conducted in 1958 by the American Institute of Public
Opinion revealed that 71% of those questioned indicated that the defendant's exercise of
the right to remain silent was an indication of guilt. H. MEYERS. SHALL WE AMEND THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT? 21 (1959). For a criticism of the poll's validity, however, see Note.
Griffin v. California: Conment on an Accused's Failure To Testify Prohibited by the
Fifth Amendment, 70 DICK. L. REV. 98, 115 (1965). But see Note. To Take the Stand or
Not To Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant With a Criminal Record, 4
CoLuM. J. LAW & SOCIAL PROBLEMS 215, 221 n.47 (1968). In another survey. 94% of de-
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criteria for determining the admissibility of evidence of drug use. Evi-
dence introduced to attack capacity must be accompanied by expert
testimony;3 7 evidence introduced to attack character must be pre-
ceded by the defendant placing his or her character in evidence. Ren-
neberg thus highlights the trial court's determination of whether drug
use is sought to be admitted to impeach capacity or character. If char-
acter has been placed in issue, the defendanf may still object to the
introduction of evidence of drug use, arguing that the evidence goes to
capacity rather than character. If successful, such an objection will
make expert testimony necessary. On the other hand, if a defendant
does not put his or her character in evidence, any attempt on cross-
examination to introduce evidence of drug use must be both related to
the issue of capacity and accompanied by expert testimony.
The Renneberg court's analysis is open to several criticisms. Ini-
tially, the plurality fails to justify its differing treatment of capacity
and character, both of which bear on credibility. 38 After establishing
in dictum the prejudice and irrelevance of evidence of drug use to a
defendant's capacity,39 the plurality's unsubstantiated holding that
such evidence is neither irrelevant nor prejudicial to an attack on
character lacks any rational foundation.
The plurality also fails to recognize contemporary views of the ef-
fect of drug use on capacity or character. Most medical authorities
fense attorneys questioned believed that jurors inferred guilt from the defendant's
failure to testify despite the absence of comment on the defendant's silence. When asked
if there is a greater probability of a defendant's acquittal if he or she testifies, 88% of all
defense attorneys and 89% of all trial judges answered in the affirmative. When asked
in what percentage of cases a defendant is convicted if he or she fails to testify, the trialjudges answered 86%, and the defense attorneys 74%. Id. at 221-22.
37. Renneberg did not expressly involve attacks on competency. However, since
Renneberg requires expert testimony to attack capacity, and the same type of evidence
is introduced to attack competency, see note 5 supra, the case impliedly requires expert
testimony to attack competency as well. Although earlier Washington cases established
the admissibility of expert testimony to attack competency, see State v. Wyse, 71 Wn.
2d 434, 429 P.2d 121 (1967); State v. Moorison, 43 Wn. 2d 23, 259 P.2d 1105 (1953);
McCutcheon v. Brownfield. 2 Wn. App. 348. 467 P.2d 868(1970), Renneberg is the
first Washington case that requires, albeit impliedly, such. evidence as a prerequisite to
any such attack.
38. The court suggested that "the alternative and more restrictive ground of char-
acter impeachment dictates admissibility here." 83 Wn. 2d at 737, 522 P.2d at 836 (em-
phasis added). What this means is most uncertain. Arguably, the court meant that char-
acter impeachment is more restricted in that it is available only after the requisite type
of testimony by defendant, i.e., testimony as to character. Yet this should have little
bearing on the requirement that the impeaching evidence's probative value be maxi-
mized, and its prejudicial quality minimized. As a practical matter, the evidence would
be no less prejudicial to the jury if introduced to attack character rather than capacity.
39. See note 20 supra.
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agree that the effect of a drug on one's capacity depends on a number
of variables, including the type of drug and the length and frequency
of usage. 40 For example, while a cocaine addict suffers marked phys-
ical and mental deterioration, 41 an opium addict's abilities to perceive,
remember and communicate are at a maximum when under the influ-
ence of the drug.42 A small dose of a barbiturate or bromide ingested
by a nonaddict will produce calm and sleep, and not affect the user's
credibility.43 If larger doses are ingested over a period of time, the "in-
tellectual processes are disturbed, thought and speech are impaired,
perception is dulled and memory is faulty."44
Similarly, a drug user's character traits may depend on a variable
factor, i.e., the type of underlying personality disorder from which the
drug user suffers. 45 One commentator, after noting that a large
number of addicts manifest psychopathic or psychoneurotic person-
ality types, states: 46
40. See Davidson, Testimonial Capacity. 39 B.U.L. REV. 172 (1959); Juviler. supra
note 5; Mack, Forensic Psychiatry and the Witness-A Survey, 7 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV.
302 (1958); Comment. Testimonial Reliability of Drug Addicts, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 259
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Testimonial Reliability]; Note. Drug Addiction Held To
Go to Credibility Rather Than To Determine Competency of Witness, 1966 UTAH L. REV.
742.
41. Testimonial Reliability, supra note 40, at 269.
42. See A.B.A.-A.M.A. JOINT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, DRUG ADDICTION:
CRIME OR DISEASE? 46-50 (1961). and medical authorities cited therein.
43. Testimonial Reliability, supra note 40, at 271. and medical authorities cited
therein.
44. L. GOODMAN & A. GILMAN, THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 157 (2d
ed. 1958). quoted in Testimonial Reliability, supra note 40, at 271.
45. A.B.A.-A.M.A. JOINT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, DRUG ADDICTION:
CRIME OR DISEASE? 51 (1961); L. KOLB, DRUG ADDICTION: A MEDICAL PROBLEM 38
(1962); Chein & Rosenfeld, Juvenile Narcotics Use, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 52, 59
(1957); Clausen, Social and Psychological Factors in Narcotics Addiction, id. at 34, 43:
Winick. Narcotics Addiction and Its Treatment, id. at 9. 19; Testimonial Reliability,
supra note 40, at 273-76.
46. Testimonial Reliability, supra note 40. at 276 (citations omitted). This comment
provides a well-documented study of the effects of differing types of drug use on an in-
dividual's capacity and character, and of the differing types of personality disorders
which may affect a drug user's credibility.
Another author summarizes credibility-affecting drugs as follows:
There are five major categories of drugs that the courts normally classify as nar-
cotics:
a. Opiates. Opium, heroin, morphine, and other synthetic morphine substitutes are
included in the opiate group. These drugs have the effect of depressing some parts
of the central nervous system while stimulating others. The use of these drugs by a
nonaddict produces inability to concentrate, reduced visual acuity, and general
lethargy. The body quickly builds up a tolerance to the opiate so that the user be-
comes physically dependent on the drug. Abstinence by the addict brings on severe
withdrawal symptoms. Prolonged use of opium or its derivatives produces no di-
rect physical or mental deterioration.
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Although the psychoneurotic is in relatively close touch with reality
and knows the difference between truth and falsehood, a consensus of
medical opinion is to the effect that he is much more likely to lie than
a normal person. . . Though most of his lying constitutes a benign,
defensive or compensatory feature of his neurosis, he may, neverthe-
less, resort to more malignant lying when his behavior is motivated by
hostility ....
Psychopaths . . .often are monstrous liars. In fact, medical con-
sensus is that if a witness is a psychopath, there is a likelihood that he
will falsify on the stand. It is in this group that the most dangerous of
all witnesses, the pathological liar is encountered.
That author concludes: "Because of the psychological antecedents of
addiction, regardless of the particular drug, addicts may be prone to
lie."'47 Thus a drug user's character, like capacity, is dependent on var-
iable factors. These variables render any generalizations concerning a
drug user's capacity or character suspect.
Compounding the complexity of the situation is the difficulty of
demonstrating some causality between drug use and a particular indi-
vidual's incapacity or lack of character. The difficulty lies in demon-
strating whether a personality disorder is capacity- or character-re-
lated, and determining whether the disorder led to the drug use, or the
drug use to the personality disorder. 48 The complexity of the situation
demands the aid of expert testimony.
b. Cocaine. This drug is a powerful stimulant causing euphoria and hallucinations.
The body does not build up a tolerance to the drug, so there is no physical addic-
tion. The effect of cocaine on a nonaddict is to produce an unreal or dream world.
Long-term use of cocaine causes mental and physical deterioration; visual, audi-
tory, and reasoning powers are impaired, and often the cocaine addict becomes
paranoiac.
c. Marihuana. This drug is like cocaine in that it is not physically addicting. It acts
on the central nervous system, but its effect is determined by the personality of the
individual user. Marihuana can act as both a depressant and a stimulant causing
hallucination, stupor, and in some cases, true psychosis.
d. Barbiturates and bromides. These drugs act as depressants on the central
nervous system. A small dose produces calmness and sleep, while a large dose can
produce the effects of intoxication. Extended use of barbiturates or bromides im-
pairs the sensory, motor, and reasoning faculties of the individual. Hallucinations
and paranoiac behavior are typical symptoms of the barbiturate addict.
e. Amphetamine. Amphetamine is a powerful stimulant often taken to keep the
user alert, But the ability to perceive and relate is dependent upon the size of the
dose taken. Overdose or repeated medication may cause dizziness, delirium, hallu-
cinations, and vasomotor disturbances.
Note, Drug Addiction Held To Go to Credibility Rather Than To Determine Compe-
tency of Witness, 1966 UTAh L. REv. 742, 744 n. 14 (citations omitted).
47. Testimonial Reliability, supra note 40, at 277.
48. See note 45 supra.
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In effect a majority of the Renneberg court acknowledged the
modern medical view insofar as capacity is concerned. By requiring
expert testimony as a prerequisite to introduction of evidence of drug
use to attack capacity, the majority rejected the reasoning of cases
conclusively linking drug use to incapacity. 49 In its next breath, how-
ever, the court ignored its own dictum by holding that drug addiction
conclusively reflects on a witness's character. On the one hand, a trial
court is to consider all possible variables in determining the admissi-
bility of evidence of drug addiction to attack capacity; on the other
hand, it need not consider any extraneous matters in determining the
admissibility of evidence of drug addiction to attack character. In
light of the differing factors which may alter the effect of drug use on
a particular witness's testimonial powers, the court's position re-
garding attacks on character is untenable.
The dissent's position is also difficult to justify. After agreeing with
the plurality that evidence of drug use is both highly prejudicial and
irrelevant to a witness's capacity, the dissent utilized both factors to
support its absolute prohibition of such evidence to attack character.
This view, however, assumes that the prejudice and irrelevance of evi-
dence of drug addiction to a witness's character will always outweigh
the probative value of such evidence. In short, the dissent advocated a
conclusive rule of law prohibiting evidence of drug addiction to attack
character, while the plurality advocated a similar rule admitting such
evidence. Both views suffer from a failure to consider all factors
which may affect a drug user's credibility.
IV. A SUGGESTED APPROACH
As an alternative to the approaches adopted by the plurality and
dissent, a more rational approach would require expert testimony as a
49. See, e.g., State v. Concannon, 25 Wash. 327, 65 P. 534 (1901) (the "depravity"
theory: drug-addicted witnesses are depraved and unworthy of belief); State v. Fong
Loon, 29 Idaho 248, 158 P. 233 (1916) (the "dream state" theory: drug-addicted wit-
nesses enter a "dream state" where they are unable to differentiate between illusion and
reality, and therefore are notorious liars); Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. McKenna, 74
F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1934) (endorsing Fong Loon's "dream state" theory); Effinger v. Ef-
finger, 48 Nev. 209, 239 P. 801 (1925) (evidence admitted establishing that the witness
was an addict, and that addicts as a class are unworthy of belief); Beland v. State, 217
S.W. 147 (Tex. Crim. App. 1919) (evidence of drug use admissible to aid jury in deter-
mining a witness's mental condition). Chief Justice Hale and Justice Hamilton, concur-
ring in part in Renneberg, suggested reliance on these older cases. See note 15 supra.
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prerequisite to admission of evidence of drug use to attack either ca-
pacity or character. 50 In light of the highly prejudicial nature of evi-
dence of drug use,51 the fluctuating relevance of drug use to either
capacity or character, 52 and particularly the complex interrelationship
of a witness's personality, drug use, capacity and character,5 3 such a
rule is the only means of reasonably determining the effect of drug use
on an individual's credibility. Absent expert testimony establishing the
relevance of drug use to capacity or character, evidence of that use
should be precluded.54
This solution to the problem posed by Renneberg is open to three
criticisms. The first is that this approach would make the issue of a
drug-using witness's credibility a "battle of the experts," unduly pro-
tracting the trial by introducing a collateral issue.55 Such an argument
fails to consider, however, that the introduction of expert testimony is
a matter within the trial court's discretion.56 Judicious exercise of that
discretion can alleviate most of the shortcomings of using expert testi-
50. Such a rule would comport with the accepted view as to the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony generally:
If the inferences to be drawn from physical facts are not a matter of such general
knowledge as to be within the common experience of laymen, opinion evidence by
a qualified expert is admissible to assist the jury in the proper understanding of the
physical facts. [Citations omitted. ] "... If the issue involves a matter of common
knowledge about which inexperienced persons are capable of forming a correctjudgment, there is no need for expert opinion. There are many matters, however,
about which the triers of fact may have a general knowledge, but the testimony of
experts would still aid in their understanding of the issues. [Citation omit-
ted.]
Gerberg v. Crosby, 52 Wn. 2d 792, 795, 329 P.2d 184, 185-86 (1958), quoting Ladd,
Expert and Other Opinion Testimony, 40 MINN. L. REv. 437, 443 (1956). See also
Knight v. Borgan, 52 Wn. 2d 219, 324 P.2d 797 (1958); McCoRMICK, supra note 5,
at§ 13.
51. See note 20 supra.
52. See notes 40-48 and accompanying text supra.
53. Id.
54. [T] he probativevalue ofthe evidence mustbeweighed and balanced againstany
prejudice which it may entail; this is to say, evidence, however competent, is rarely
admissible when its relevancy is entirely engulfed by the prejudice which it may
engender.
State v. Golladay, 78 Wn. 2d 121, 142, 470 P.2d 191, 204-05 (1970). This rule applies
despite the normally broad discretion vested in the trial court to determine both the
scope of cross-examination and the admissibility of relevant evidence. Id.
55. For an excellent discussion of this problem, see People v. Williams, 6 N.Y.2d
1.8, 27, 159 N.E.2d 549, 554, 187 N.Y.S.2d 750, 757 (1959); see also McCormick, Sci-
ence, Experts and the Courts, 29 TExAs L. REv. 611 (195 1); Myers, "The Battle of the
Experts": A New Approach to an Old Problem in Medical Testimony, 44 NEB. L. REV.
539 (1965).
56. State v. Richardson, 197 Wash. 157, 84 P.2d 699 (1938); State v. Smails, 63
Wash. 172, 115 P. 82 (1911); MCCORMICK, supra note 5, at §§ 13-18.
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mony. For instance, the trial court can determine the necessity of ex-
pert testimony in light of the importance of the drug-using witness's
testimony. If the testimony relates to a clearly collateral issue, ques-
tions concerning the witness's drug use need not be considered; the
probative value of such evidence is minimal and irrelevant to the prin-
cipal issues of the case. If the testimony is vital to a party's case, there
is more reason to consider the effect of drug use on the witness's credi-
bility. While this approach will require the court to determine the rela-
tive importance of a witness's testimony, such a determination is more
within the province of a court than deciding if drug use has affected a
witness's capacity or character. Moreover, the trial court can limit the
number of experts testifying for each party57 or call an independent
expert witness to consider the drug-user's credibility.58 By exercising
its discretion in such a manner, the trial court can greatly reduce the
possibility of an unmanageable "battle of the experts" while assuring
maximum access to all facts relevant to a drug-using witness's credi-
bility.
A second objection to the proposed solution might be that the ex-
57. Power to limit the number of expert witnesses is part of the trial court's general
discretionary power over admission of expert testimony. See State v. Butler, 27 N.J.
560, 143 A.2d 530, 553 (1958) (court suggests three alternatives: (1) a court-appointed,
impartial expert; (2) one expert selected by each party, and one chosen by the court, for
a joint examination of the witness; and (3) an independent expert engaged by each
party); People v. Hudson, 341 Il1. 187, 173 N.E. 278, 279 (1930) (court suggests that
three experts, one chosen by each party and one chosen by the court, examine the wit-
ness); Note, The Mentally Abnormal Witness: Challenges to his Competence and Credi-
bility, 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 330, 344 (1958).
An expert is required to possess special skills beyond those of the average person.
State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 82 Wn. 2d 584, 512 P.2d 1049 (1973); State v. Nelson, 72
Wn. 2d 269, 432 P.2d 857 (1967). The competency of the expert witness is a matter
within the trial court's discretion, and is subject to review only for manifest abuse.
State v. J-R Distributors, Inc.. supra; State v. Nelson, supra; State v. Liles. II Wn. App.
166. 521 P.2d 973 (1974); State v. Parker, 9 Wn. App. 970. 515 P.2d 1307 (1974).
In the case of drug use a medical doctor, psychiatrist or any other person experienced
in dealing with drug users would potentially qualify as an expert witness.
58. "The existence of the judge's power to call witnesses generally and expert wit-
nesses particularly seems fairly well recognized in this country." MCCORMICK, supra
note 5. at § 17. See generally Myers, supra note 55; Weihofen. Eliminating the Battle of
Experts in Criminal Insanity Cases, 48 MIcH. L. REV. 961, 964 n.8 (1950); Note, Ju-
dicial Authority to Call Expert Witnesses, 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 375 (1957). This power has
been recognized by the Washington court regarding the valuation of real property by
expert witnesses called by the trial court. Gilmartin v. Stewart Inv. Co., 43 Wn. 2d 289,
261 P.2d 73 (1953); Ramsey v. Mading, 36 Wn. 2d 303, 217 P.2d 1041 (1950).
On introduction of expert testimony regarding drug use, see generally Juviler, supra
note 5; Weihofen, Testimonial Competence and Credibility, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 53
(1965); Note. Psychiatric Evaluation of the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 49 YALE LJ.
1324 (1950).
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tent of medical and scientific knowledge as to the effect of drug use on
one's credibility is so limited that expert testimony is simply not
helpful.5 9 Yet this objection apparently did not persuade the Renne-
berg court with respect to impeachment of a defendant's capacity, and
has not precluded the introduction of similar expert testimony to de-
termine the issue of criminal insanity. 60
Finally, the suggested approach may be criticized because, if a de-
fendant has not placed his or her character in issue, experts still must
determine whether evidence is introduced to attack the defendant's
capacity or character.61 This criticism is refuted by noting that this
shortcoming will inhere in any approach which retains the
capacity/character dichotomy, because an attack on character re-
quires that the defendant have first placed his or her character in evi-
dence, while an attack on capacity does not. The only means of
avoiding this predicament is to abrogate the capacity/character dichot-
omy-an action which would unjustifiably deter a defendant from
taking the stand.6 2 Furthermore, the problem can be minimized by
interpreting "capacity" as narrowly as possible to include only the
physiological traits of perception, memory and communicative ability,
and interpreting "character" broadly to include all other factors that
might affect a drug-using witness's credibility. Thus, unless expert tes-
timony clearly identifies the evidence of drug use as relating to capa-
city, the admissibility of such evidence must be preceded by: (1) the
defendant having placed his or her character in evidence according
to the Bauman rule; and (2) expert testimony establishing a causal
link between the drug use and the witness's character. 63
59. See Tonkovich v. Department of Labor & Indus., 31 Wn. 2d 220, 195 P.2d 638
(1948); MCCORMICK, supra note 5, at § 13.
60. See, e.g., State v. Tyler, 77 Wn. 2d 726, 466 P.2d 1200 (1970), vacated in part,
408 U.S. 937 (1972); State v. Welsh, 8 Wn. App. 719, 508 P.2d 1041 (1973); State v.
Utter, 4 Wn. App. 137, 479 P.2d 946 (1971).
61. If the defendant's character has been placed in evidence, under the suggested
approach there will be no need to determine whether the evidence of drug addiction goes
to capacity or character. In either case all that will be necessary is expert testimony es-
tablishing the relevance of drug use to incapacity or a lack of character.
62. Were there no capacity/character dichotomy, and therefore no requirement that
the defendant place his or her character in evidence prior to introduction of evidence
of an unrelated act of misconduct, a defendant with some highly prejudicial misconduct
in his or her background would be loathe to testify even to events surrounding the al-
leged crime. To testify would be to expose oneself to cross-examination as to the highly
prejudicial matter, regardless of the scope of the testimony.
63. The court could require that a party demonstrate the relevance of drug use to
incapacity or a lack of character by a preponderance of the evidence, which is the
burden of proof utilized in criminal insanity. See State v. Tyler, 77 Wn. 2d 726, 466
P.2d 120 (1970) vacated in part, 408 U.S. 937 (1972); State v. Collins, 50 Wn. 2d
740, 314 P.2d 660 (1957); State v. Putzell, 40 Wn. 2d 174, 242 P.2d 180 (1952).
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While no approach will be faultless, the requirement that expert tes-
timony be required to connect evidence of drug use to either capacity
or character seems preferable to that proposed by any of the three
opinions in Renneberg. The suggested approach not only recognizes
accepted views regarding the effect of drug use on credibility, but also
insures that the defendant may testify without fear of cross-examina-
tion as to an unduly prejudicial matter which may have little bearing
on his or her credibility in the matter being litigated. Ultimately this
approach accommodates what should be the court's objectives: en-
couragement of all testimony which may aid the trier of fact in its de-
liberation, with minimum prejudice to the defendant.
V. CONCLUSION
Several conclusions can be drawn as to the impact of State v. Ren-
neberg on Washington evidence law. The case can and should be in-
terpreted as retaining the Bauman rule, allowing a defendant to testify
concerning the events leading to and surrounding the crime without
fear of cross-examination as to unrelated misconduct. This view mini-
mizes the possibility of impairment of a defendant's constitutional
right to freely decide to remain silent or testify. It also provides trial
courts some guidelines in determining whether a defendant has placed
his or her character in issue.
The Renneberg court's dictum, requiring expert testimony as a pre-
requisite to introduction of evidence of drug use to attack capacity,
properly recognizes both the highly prejudicial nature of evidence of
drug use and the fluctuating relevance of drug use to a lack of credi-
bility. Unfortunately the court's holding, requiring only that the de-
fendant's character be placed in issue prior to introduction of evidence
of drug use, fails to recognize either of these factors. A more desirable
approach would require expert testimony to establish the effect of
drug use on a witness's capacity or character and, absent such a show-
ing, preclude the introduction of evidence of drug use because of its
highly prejudicial nature. This approach recognizes the highly prejudi-
cial nature of evidence of drug use, but allows the introduction of
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